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Abstract: The twentieth century United States provides a natural experiment to measure the 
strength and persistence of entrepreneurial cultures. Assuming immigrants bear the cultures of 
their birth place, comparison of revealed entrepreneurial propensities of US immigrant groups in 
1910 and 2000 reflected these backgrounds. According to this test North-western Europe, where 
modern economic growth is widely held to have originated, did not host unusually strong 
entrepreneurial cultures. Instead such cultures were carried by persons originating from Greece, 
Turkey and Italy, together with Jews. The rise of widespread female entrepreneurship provides 
additional evidence by showing that this trait systematically responded less strongly, but in the 
same way, to cultural background as did male entrepreneurship. 
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Measurement of entrepreneurial culture requires distinguishing between 
motivation and opportunity. Opportunities depend on national institutions; the 
legal environment and costs of setting up a firm strongly influence differences in 
business start-up rates between countries (Klapper, Laeven and Rajan 2006; 
Ciccone and Papaioannou 2007). Capital or credit rationing may also determine 
prospects for entrepreneurship (Black, De Meza and Jeffries 1996; Blanchflower 
and Oswald 1998). Motivations on the other hand are determined by preferences, 
but likely to be swayed by the national and regional environment as well 
(Beugelsdijk 2007). Unlike opportunities however, motivations can be established 
by surveys. Large proportions of workers state that they would prefer to be self-
employed (Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer 2001). So the very wide variation 
between nations in percentages favouring self-employment may indicate either 
differences in frustrated aspirations, or a broad range of national entrepreneurial 
motivations, or both. The present study aims to identify motivation, as determined 
by national culture, more precisely by controlling for opportunity over the 
twentieth century. 
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Some plausible assumptions allow the United States to be a natural experiment for 
separating entrepreneurial culture from national institutions. If immigrants bear 
the traditions of their birth place, comparison of revealed entrepreneurial 
propensities of US immigrant groups will reflect these backgrounds. In the 
common institutional environment differential entrepreneurial behaviour by origin 
depends upon culture so long as certain conditions are met. Three of these 
conditions are: 
(i) the absence of selection processes favouring, or discriminating against, 
emigration of entrepreneurial types from a particular state,  
(ii) that country of origin is an indicator of entrepreneurial culture, and  
(iii) that non-cultural systematic differences between origin countries do 
not bias the choice of entrepreneurship.  
‘Selection processes’, such as the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act operating at the 
beginning of the last century, are usually well known and to some extent can be 
taken into account. A working assumption is that cultural heterogeneity is greater 
between origin countries than within them, but obvious exceptions are noted. In 
addition whether a source country’s level of development or regulatory 
environment, rather than culture, predisposed the entrepreneurial tendencies of 
migrants can be tested.  
The natural experiment shows that North-western Europe, where modern 
economic growth is widely believed to have originated, did not host unusually 
entrepreneurial cultures, rather the reverse in the case of England. On the other 
hand two groups, Greeks and Jews, revealed strong and persistent entrepreneurial 
tendencies in both benchmark years and therefore, it may be assumed, throughout 
the twentieth century. Cultural change, that by the end of the century had initiated 
widespread female entrepreneurship, also ensured that this trait responded less 
strongly to the origin background. Females from more entrepreneurial cultures 
were less entrepreneurial than males but those from less than averagely 
entrepreneurial source countries were more so. Nonetheless females showed 
qualitatively similar traits by origin as males at the end of the twentieth century. 
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Section 1 explains the idea and measures of entrepreneurial culture chosen, 
Section 2 sets out the model of entrepreneurship and culture, Section 3 describes 
the historical processes generating the immigrant samples, Section 4 discusses the 
extent to which the United States constituted ‘a level playing field’ for the groups 
studied and possible tests, and Section 5 presents the results of the analysis. 
Entrepreneurial Culture 
For present purposes culture is the common ways of thinking created by shared 
belief systems, similar ways of earning a living, and mutual educational 
arrangements. In the language of neoclassical economics, culture is a form of 
collective taste or preference. Because human beings cannot make absolute 
judgments, they draw comparisons from their environment, from the past or from 
their expectations of the future to make their choices (Stutzer 2004). Their culture 
as defined is therefore likely to influence their behaviour. Persistence of culture in 
this light is a prerequisite for rational (consistent) choice.  
Culture then consists of beliefs and values transmitted ‘fairly unchanged’ from 
generation to generation (Guiso et al 2006). The pace of cultural change is judged 
sufficiently slow to convince some that culture is a fundamental force in economic 
history (Landes 1998 516-7). ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture was important in the past for 
economic development and Japanese ‘collectivism’ is supposedly the wave of the 
future (Temin 1997).  
An alternative view is that although cultures seem ‘sticky’ they can be ‘fluid’. 
(Jones 2006 Ch 2). Most business culture literature overstates cultural stability 
and persistence because it consists of snapshots of social behaviour and attitudes, 
according to Eric Jones (2006 258). In the long run culture will probably respond 
to historical events, be moulded by institutions and transformed by economic 
development. But over shorter periods culture may be sufficiently enduring to act 
as a predetermined variable in a model of entrepreneurship.  
National cultures are often heterogeneous; even in the twenty-first century. 
Armenian immigrant entrepreneurs were prominent in many countries at different 
periods of history without an Armenian ‘country of origin’ (Godley 2006). Again, 
numbers of Greeks living outside Greece in the first decade of the twentieth 
century were much greater than those within the country and Greek migration 
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from Ottoman-dominated areas, especially for political reasons, was common 
(Salutos 1964 16, 23, 33). Further north, migrants from the Russian Empire and 
Poland in the years before the First World War are very likely to have been Jews 
because of the anti-Jewish Pogroms from the 1880s. Nonetheless in the absence of 
information about specific relevant fractionalisation or events, the assumption 
which is tested here is that the country of origin is an indicator of distinctive 
entrepreneurial culture1.  
An operational definition of entrepreneurship is needed to identify supportive or 
detrimental cultures. An entrepreneur is one who takes riskier decisions for 
greater rewards, exploiting opportunities that others have not noticed (Kirzner 
1973; Casson 2003). Becoming an employer is an entrepreneurial act in the sense 
that it involves taking on risk. It also necessitates being innovative, to the extent 
that setting up any business requires looking for a gap in the market, however 
narrowly defined. A measure of entrepreneurial culture is therefore the tendency 
of members of a large group to become employers, rather than employees.  
A stronger entrepreneurial culture may not always predict more successful 
entrepreneurship. For the constraints within which choices are exercised also 
affect outcomes. Individuals inheriting a highly entrepreneurial culture are simply 
more likely to use their initiative and ingenuity. How successful they are, and 
whether they do this in politics, crime or legitimate business, will be determined 
by institutions, resources and history, among other factors (Baumol 1990). 
We employ two measures of enterprise which may be taken respectively as upper 
and lower bound estimates. The first is simply the chances of a member of the 
immigrant group being an employer – relative to other groups. Even though 
migrants may be exceptional in their originating country, each immigrant group 
will be exceptional to the same extent, unless there are historically unusual ‘push’ 
factors that must be identified qualitatively. Economic costs of movement differ 
by original location, as does the strength of the push factor but normally these will 
only affect the relative volumes of migrant groups. Persecution may be a reason to 
migrate for large numbers. Yet only when this or other processes select the more 
or less entrepreneurial from a country does it affect the present ‘experiment’.  
                                                 
1
 A test of city- or region- based culture, as well as that of a nation, would be an interesting but a 
considerably larger project. 
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We do not compare immigrants with those born in US (as for instance does 
Lofstrom 2002) but with each other. The US-born are more likely to inherit a 
family business, which also takes individuals into the employer category. Migrant 
self-employment through inheritance by contrast is unlikely and is probably in 
start-ups.  
The entrepreneurship ratio does not take into account differences among the 
migrants in characteristics that might influence entrepreneurship independently of 
culture. Those from some origin countries were more likely than others to be 
literate at the beginning of the twentieth century. Such migrants might be 
relatively highly entrepreneurial because of these attributes, whereas purely for 
cultural reasons they might be less entrepreneurial than those who were illiterate.  
Whether the ratio measure is appropriate depends on what is assumed culturally 
determined. It could be contended that education and literacy, like 
entrepreneurship, depend upon culture. They are not independent variables but 
endogenous in the occupational choice model that includes culture. If so their 
inclusion would lead to an underestimation of the contribution of culture, and the 
true cultural measure is simply the unadjusted chances of entrepreneurship. But 
when literacy, wealth and other variables are not culturally determined, our 
second measure is appropriate; the chance of becoming an employer, holding 
constant a range of other influences on the outcome.  
Modelling Culture and Occupational Choice 
Becoming an entrepreneur usually needs capital, which may need accumulating 
first. Then during earlier periods the would-be entrepreneur works for wages and 
saves. In later years, when those who continue to opt for wage work or leisure can 
live off the interest on their savings, the entrepreneur puts the savings into the 
business (for example Evans and Jovanocic 1989; Xu 1999). Cultures that 
emphasise deferred gratification, that favour a low rate of time discount, will 
encourage savings, and may boost entry to entrepreneurship by bringing forward 
the date at which the minimum capital for the business start is achieved. 
Another economic impact of culture is through transactions costs. If buyers and 
sellers believe they can trust each other, insurance, monitoring and enforcement 
costs can be markedly reduced, boosting the volume of transactions, and therefore 
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the gains from trade. Mark Casson (1991) divides business cultures between those 
with low and high trust. A high trust business culture is likely to stimulate lower 
vertical integration because direct control within the firm is less necessary than in 
a low trust culture, for arms-length market relations are relatively reliable. 
Business entrepreneurship too will more probably flourish where agreements are 
expected to be honoured.  
Culture may also impinge upon the supply of effort. Since entrepreneurship 
requires considerable commitment of time and energy (the self-employed work 
longer hours than the employed (Blanchflower and Shadworth 2007)), a culturally 
transmitted work ethic could well influence the supply of entrepreneurship. 
Deciding to become an entrepreneur requires a comparison of certain waged 
employment (paying w ) and rentier income from assets ( A ) with uncertain 
entrepreneurial income (pi ) A critical feature of entrepreneurship is therefore 
taking on risk and the agent’s risk attitude (α ) (Kihlstrom and Laffont 1979). The 
occupational choice turns on a judgement about the difference (Y ) between the 
uncertain wellbeing from self-employment, ( )E U , and that from paid 
employment:  
(1) ( )( ) ( ), ,Y E U A U A wpi α α∗ = + − +  
Risk attitudes may be culturally influenced and the willingness to make risky 
choices will also depend upon cultural features such as family support networks. 
For given risk attitudes, a person with a higher income is more willing to accept a 
gamble of a given size. The subjective cost of an uncertain prospect, relative to 
the expected value of this payoff, is lower the larger is the income at which it is 
offered. Hence the rich are more likely to accept a given bet than the poor, and are 
therefore more probably entrepreneurial on these grounds.  
This conclusion only holds though when the basis for comparison is the same; that 
is both the rich and the poor have equal access to safe incomes as an alternative to 
entrepreneurship. More commonly, the better off will face a wider range of 
options. Insofar as entrepreneurship is time-consuming, and leisure is a normal 
good, the rich will be less likely to opt for this occupation. The relative impacts of 
leisure preference, risk attitudes and the personal capital requirement for business 
starts then determine how wealth and income affect the decision to become an 
entrepreneur. 
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In terms of equation (1) leisure preference and time preference can be considered 
as additional dimensions of α . If both utility functions in (1) are linear functions 
of a characteristics vector X : 
(2) Y ε∗ ′= +X b  
where b  is a vector of parameters and ε  is a normally distributed disturbance 
term with zero mean and unit variance. Although Y ∗  cannot be measured 
directly, the decisions made as a consequence of it can be. An individual chooses 
entrepreneurship ( 1Y = ) when 0Y ∗ ≥  and can be seen to do so. Alternatively the 
person opts for waged employment ( 0Y = ) when 0Y ∗ < , which is equally 
observable. For individual i  then, 
(3) [ ] ( )Pr 1 Pr 0i iY Y f∗ ′ = = ≥ =  X b  
The key variable in the X  vector is country of origin, a measure of immigrant 
culture, the α  of equation (1). Even with a broad definition of culture the need 
to acquire savings and work experience at first increases entrepreneurship with 
age, and perhaps eventually diminishes it (Parker 2004). Information about 
entrepreneurial opportunities is likely to increase with duration of immigrants’ 
residence in the United States, and with ability to speak English. Both elements of 
the X  vector would then raise the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur. As 
noted already, an entrepreneur’s personal wealth, either as a result of savings or 
inherited, is typically necessary to provide the equity in the new business - for 
start up capital. By increasing awareness of opportunities, formal education, or in 
earlier periods literacy, could increase entrepreneurial chances.  
Entrepreneurship may be perceived as a better way of providing more income 
than wage employment and families can be expensive. In such circumstances 
marriage increases the likelihood of choosing to become an entrepreneur2. Some 
migrants intend to return to their country of origin and these are less likely to 
make the commitment of starting a business. Marriage may encourage such 
commitment, which would also be signalled by ‘naturalisation’. Gender will 
probably influence the chances of becoming an entrepreneur as well, particularly 
in earlier periods. To allow that work experience influences entrepreneurial choice 
we also control for different sectors in which employment or self-employment 
                                                 
2
 Siqueria’s (2007) analysis of the US 2000 census for Brazilian immigrants find that being 
married increases the chances of owning their own business. 
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takes place. Greater expected rewards will increase the likelihood of an individual 
becoming an entrepreneur. This provides a link of the entrepreneurial supply with 
the demand or opportunities for entrepreneurship that have not been considered so 
far. 
Apart from the contribution of common (US) institutions, the opportunities for 
entrepreneurship depend on industry entry barriers or their absence. Barriers now 
are lowest in the wholesaling, retailing and construction industries. Finance and 
business services also offer high returns sometimes without high barriers. These 
opportunities, reflected in high expected returns, directed the supply of 
entrepreneurs. 
Substituting out expected returns form both entrepreneurial supply and 
opportunities yields a reduced form equation of the probability that an individual 
would become an entrepreneur: 
Pr[ 1] (
)
Y f= = gender, marital status, residence duration, 
                      formal human capital, English speaking, 
                     sector, age, wealth, culture
 
With this equation two hypotheses can be tested. The first is that entrepreneurial 
cultures (generally estimated from country of origin) make a difference to 
behaviour. The second hypothesis is that entrepreneurial cultures persist for long 
periods. 
The US Immigrant Samples 
The central idea is that to isolate the impact of culture from that of institutions on 
the business start-up rate, we can consider how those brought up in one country 
perform in a social and economic environment where institutions and market 
opportunities are different- the United States. During the twentieth as well as the 
nineteenth centuries, immigrants from a wide range of cultures arrived in the 
common environment of the United States and some of them started their own 
businesses. Cultural persistence here is the stability of entrepreneurial or start-up 
propensities between the 1910 and 2000 US Censuses3.  
                                                 
3
 5 percent samples from IPUMS (http://usa.ipums.org/usa/). 1910 is the first year that the 
employer/ employee question is asked. 
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Agricultural employment is excluded from the sample because opportunities and 
conditions were so different from other sectors. The sample is also restricted to 
origins from which migrants were quite numerous in 1910 in order to make the 
comparison over time more consistent. For instance Koreans were not included 
because, although sufficiently numerous in 2000, in 1910 there were too few 
working as employers outside agriculture. But the highly entrepreneurial Middle 
East was disaggregated subsequently to examine whether particular sources were 
driving the result4. Persons ‘working on own account’ in the early period, and 
‘unincorporated business’ in the later period, are left out of the entrepreneurial 
category because they could be associated with casual work. Instead we focus on 
employers and incorporated businesses, on the grounds that these groups match 
more closely with the theoretical concept of an entrepreneur.  
During the period leading up to 1910, migrants were generally not ‘filtered’ or 
selected by the host country. So origins of immigrants to the US at different times 
varied mainly with the strength of ‘push factors’ in source countries. During the 
1840s harvest failure thrust large numbers of German and Irish migrants across 
the Atlantic, while persecution of Jews triggered another wave of migrants from 
Russia and Poland beginning in the 1880s. Population growth coupled with weak 
economic development encouraged increasing migration from southern and 
eastern Europe in the 1890s. Population growth too played a part, along with 
expanding demand for agricultural labour, in swelling Mexican immigration in the 
first decade of the twentieth century.  
The one major exception to free entry was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, 
which allowed Congress to suspend general Chinese immigration. Although the 
Act refused entry to Chinese skilled and unskilled labourers and Chinese 
employed in mining, Chinese nationals with $1000 were still allowed into the 
United States as ‘merchants’ (Lee 1960 p79) - a condition highly relevant to their 
entrepreneurial characteristics. Later, and probably too late to influence 
substantially the present natural experiment, the ‘Gentleman’s Agreement’ of 
1907-08 blocked unskilled Japanese migration to the US, when the Japanese 
government agreed not to issue passports to labourers (Ichihashi 1932 Ch 16). 
With the Chinese exception, 1910 is therefore a good year in which to conduct the 
experiment. 
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 The base case in the analysis is ‘other North America’. 
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The period of relatively open immigration ended shortly afterwards. In 1924 the 
Immigration Act limited the number of immigrants who could be admitted from 
any country to two percent of the number of people from that country who were 
already living in the United States in 1890. Another major policy change came 
with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (becoming law in 1968) which 
abolished the national origin quotas but introduced Western and Eastern 
hemisphere quotas.  
Liberalisation continued with the Immigration Act of 1990. After the Act, the 
United States admitted 700,000 new immigrants annually, an increase of 200,000. 
The new legislation continued to give preference to immigrants with family 
members already in the United States. Consequently the past stock of immigrants 
and quota sizes were extremely influential in determining the country of origin of 
US immigrants in the years after the Act (Clark, Hatton and Williamson 2007). Is 
this likely to bias the degree of entrepreneurship of migrants relative to those in 
their country of origin? 
A Level Playing Field? 
Migration might be selective by entrepreneurial predisposition according to the 
level of development for a number of reasons. Perhaps migrants from poorer 
countries were less able to found businesses because they lacked the skills 
appropriate to a more advanced economy. Alternatively they might be 
disproportionately forced in to self-employment because of the same deficiencies. 
Another hypothesis is that poorer people, lacking in financial resources, might 
migrate from richer countries and richer people from poorer countries. If 
resources were not adequately controlled in our model (by property ownership), 
and were necessary to entrepreneurship (as our model parameter estimates 
indicate) then behaviour attributable to the national level of development would 
incorrectly be identified as a cultural effect. 
A rather different selection process could operate with similar impact if some 
origin countries’ institutions affecting entrepreneurship (rather than wage earners) 
were less favourable than others and therefore disproportionately more 
entrepreneurial types emigrated. Again, labour market discrimination against or in 
favour of particular migrant groups possibly crowded immigrants selectively by 
origin into entrepreneurship. In the late 19th century Union branches spread 
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internationally, controlling jobs in certain sections of industry on behalf of those 
from higher income economies (Foreman-Peck 1992)5. Migrants from newer 
source countries would be hard pressed to find work in these sectors. More 
generally, (and perhaps an implication of Hatton and Leigh 2007) 'pioneer 
immigrants' may have been less accepted in the employment market and so more 
often pushed into self-employment. If for whatever reason labour markets were 
segmented by national origin, the consequential lower wages of new immigrant 
groups may have favoured entrepreneurial choice in these groups (creating ‘sweat 
shops’ for instance). A new immigrant entrepreneur employing members of the 
same community could pay lower wages than prevailed in the wider host 
community and would thereby achieve a competitive advantage.  
Wages undoubtedly did differ between migrant groups before the First World 
War. Hatton’s (2000) measurement of immigrant earning power, translated as 
‘immigrant quality’, shows Jews among the highest earners before 1914, with 
coefficients identical to those of the Dutch and Finnish. Jewish immigrants were 
also highly entrepreneurial in both London and New York in the generation before 
the First World War (Godley 2001) - not what would be expected if high Jewish 
wages discouraged Jewish entrepreneurial choices. By contrast migrants from 
Syria and Turkey recorded the largest ethnic handicap in wage earning. Jewish, 
Turkish and Syrian originating migrants all were among the most entrepreneurial 
but their wage positions (and presumably therefore their skills) in the US market 
differed markedly. This is inconsistent with at least one version of 
‘entrepreneurial bias’. 
Once the particular migration stream became integrated into the host culture, or 
better accepted by the host community, they were more able to slot into paid 
employment if they wished6. Market segmentation of given migrant groups 
probably could not persist over three generations. New migrants groups in 1910 
could not be new in 2000 as well. Hence a fundamental test of culture versus 
labour market barriers is persistence or otherwise of behaviour across the 
twentieth century when most conditions changed. A common value for the culture 
estimate at the two dates must imply either that identical conditions somehow 
persisted or replaced each other, or that they were not of fundamental importance 
                                                 
5
 At the Homestead Works in 1892 the Welsh managed the rolling mills and the Irish the Bessemer 
blast furnaces. In the International Association of Machinist there were individual branches 
speaking German, French or Bohemian at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
6
 Suggested to us by Tim Hatton. 
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in both periods. However it does not follow that if the culture estimates are 
different at the two dates that culture was not important on both occasions. 
To summarise, the ‘playing field’ for migrants may not have been level because of 
different GDPs per capita in origin countries, because of unusually unfavourable 
(or favourable) source country institutions for entrepreneurship, or because newer 
immigrant groups suffered more labour market discrimination. Critically though, 
because of the selection of similar migrant groups in the year 2000 as in 1910, this 
last possibility is very unlikely for the second year. In experiments below we 
assess the importance of the other possible sources of bias. 
Results 
Entrepreneurial Chances 
Entrepreneurial chances are the simplest, and almost certainly biased, measure of 
entrepreneurial culture, but nonetheless are informative as descriptive statistics. 
Consistent with Max Weber’s (1905) doctrine, US immigrants from the ‘Catholic 
group’ of countries (Table 1) – Italy, Mexico, Portugal and Ireland in 1910 are 
near the bottom of the ranking of probabilities or ratios, but a contrary finding is 
that Spain and Cuba are near the top. The highest chances in 1910 are those of 
China (which was subject to special influences already noted), Spain, Germany, 
Greece and the Netherlands, followed by the Russian empire (the majority of 
migrants from which were Jewish refugees). 
In the year 2000 (Table 1), the top four entrepreneurial groups are those 
originating from Israel, Greece, Syria and Lebanon7, and Italy. The position was 
broadly similar in contemporary Australia (in 1996) (Collins 2003). Judged by the 
criterion of comparable entrepreneurial proportions at both dates8, Mexico, Cuba, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Turkey and Japan show stability, or persistence of 
entrepreneurial culture. Greece and Italy increase entrepreneurship probabilities 
substantially, as does Austria (with different boundaries). The ratios for Portugal 
and Ireland also rise. Migrants from England, Scotland, France, Spain and 
Germany were less entrepreneurial at the end of the century than at the beginning. 
                                                 
7
 Syria and Lebanon were also the most highly entrepreneurial in 1910 but the sample available 
was judged too small to report. 
13 
Overall the chances of entrepreneurship decline from 5.1% in the 1910 sample to 
3.2% in the 2000 sample because of the massive increase in Mexican immigration 
with a low entrepreneurial ratio. 
Could this pattern stem from the level of development of the source country (GDP 
per capita), from source country institutions or from the number of migrants 
already sent, say, two generations before 1910? Neither GDP per capita, joint 
stock companies per head (the institutions proxy) nor size of established migrant 
community is a significant predictor of the entrepreneurship ratio (Table 2). In 
1850 the largest migrant group came from Ireland (unentrepreneurial in 1910) and 
the second largest from Germany (with a high entrepreneurial ratio in 1910).  
A more significant result obtains for ‘cultural convergence’, an expected 
consequence of globalisation. Those countries- Germany is an illustrative case- 
with high entrepreneurship ratios in 1910 were likely to experience declines in 
‘entrepreneurial spirit’ by 2000, while those with low ratios – such as Italy – 
probably exhibited a rise in entrepreneurial spirit. This is not convergence in the 
sense of catching up, but over-taking, for as Figure 1 shows, on average countries 
with ratios above 6 percent in 1910 have lower ratios in 2000, and conversely. 
The very large absolute value of the negative coefficient of the convergence 
equation implies that the ranking of entrepreneurial cultures will be reversed over 
the century. Either this is because of the impermanence of cultures, or, the 
interpretation preferred here, because of the limited nature of the ratio measure. 
The origin groups that decline can be classified broadly as the western European 
core, and those that increase, the European periphery (Table 3). The rest of the 
world contributes the stable group. If new immigrant groups in 1910 were more 
prone to entrepreneurship, then we should see convergence over the twentieth 
century with entrepreneur ratios falling (dependent variables less than unity in 
Figure 1) for the high ratio groups in 1910 and no significant change among 
established migrant groups (dependent variable = 1) or perhaps a slight rise. In 
fact around half the sample increased their entrepreneurial ratios over the 
twentieth century. They include the largest migrant group in 1850, the Irish, as 
well as ‘new migrants’ such as those from Greece and Italy who only began 
arriving in the decades immediately before the First World War. A possible 
reason for these changes is the inadequacy of the simple ratio as a measure of 
entrepreneurial culture. All three groups may have become more entrepreneurial 
                                                                                                                                     
8
 According to t-tests. 
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as they accumulated wealth and education, without any change in underlying 
culture. 
Entrepreneurial Controls  
The alternative measure of culture supposes that education, wealth and other 
variables that determine entrepreneurial behaviour, in practice are more 
influenced by institutions and chance than by culture. If so, a more accurate 
measure of entrepreneurial culture can be obtained by controlling for these and 
other variables. On the second interpretation of culture, Figure 1 does not show 
genuine cultural convergence but the impact of convergence of non-cultural 
influences upon entrepreneurial behaviour.  
We therefore first describe the results for the controls estimated from logit 
equations (Table 4). Property ownership in 1910 raised the chances of being an 
employer by 1.6 percentage points, by the same percentage as naturalisation and 
residence in the US for more than 10 years (there is not much evidence of 
increasing effects beyond a decade). Age increased the chances of becoming an 
employer up to 58 years old. The rise in probability between the ages of 30 and 60 
was about 1.5 percentage points. Being male in 1910 added 1.1 percent to the 
likelihood of entrepreneurship, while literacy and the ability to speak English 
contributed 1.1 and 1.4 percentage points respectively. 
These are contributors to the supply of entrepreneurs. On the demand side or 
entrepreneurial opportunities, in 1910 unsurprisingly the sector with the lowest 
entry barrier for entrepreneurship was the wholesale and retail trade (relative to 
the base case of mining). Finance, real estate and personal and professional 
services came second in raising the chances of entrepreneurship. Construction was 
the third easiest sector for new entry. Manufacturing was little better than mining, 
and transport, communication and other utilities was not significantly different 
from the base case.  
Ninety years later the marginal effects of the entrepreneurial supply variables 
were rather smaller in general in 2000 than in 1910. In part this is because the 
general propensity for entrepreneurship had fallen and perhaps also because of the 
greater abundance of human capital. Table 4 shows that being male increased 
entrepreneurial chances by 1.3 percent in 2000, unusually rather more than in 
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1910. The impact of marriage on the probability of entrepreneurship more than 
halved in 2000 relative to 1910..  
Age at which probability of entrepreneurship was maximised rose to almost 63, 
perhaps reflecting greater life expectation. Length of residence in the US for 
maximum probability of entrepreneurship increased to 16-20 years in 2000. 
Property ownership raised the likelihood by 1.1 percentage points in the later year, 
compared with 1.6 percentage points 90 years earlier, possibly because credit 
arrangements became easier. Education variables at the later date replace 
‘literacy’ in 2000 and so are not directly comparable, but college education 
increased entrepreneurial chances. Changes in technology enhanced the 
attractiveness of the transport, communication and other utilities sector for start-
up businesses. Organisational changes may well have been responsible for the 
opposite effect in Personal, Recreational and Professional Services. 
Controlled Entrepreneurial Culture Effects 
From the same logit equations above, we take the country of origin coefficients of 
Table 5. At the 5 percent probability we cannot reject a zero ‘controlled’ culture 
effect for the heterogeneous group of Portugal, Netherlands, Scotland, France, 
Germany, Austria, Mexico, and Cuba in 1910 according to the LR test (not 
shown) (Table 5). In the ‘above average’ entrepreneurship groups, we note that 
China was subject to restrictions which would enhance entrepreneurship in the 
US, and that the Russia-originating migrants were predominantly Jews. This 
leaves persons originating from Greece, Spain, Turkey and Italy in that order as 
disproportionately entrepreneurial, other things being equal, in 1910 (excluding 
Cuba because the coefficient is not significantly different from zero). At the other 
end of the scale Ireland provided disproportionately the most unentrepreneurial 
types, controlling for other influences, followed by Sweden and then England. All 
three were below the group average. 
In 2000 Jews (persons from Israel), migrants from Greece and Turkey, and Italy 
are among the most entrepreneurial, consistent with some cultural 
persistence9(Table 5). Cuba joins the entrepreneurial group as does (a smaller) 
Austria. England remains significantly unentrepreneurial, joined by Japan, 
                                                 
9
 Syria and Lebanon-originating persons were also disproportionately entrepreneurial. They were 
in 1910 as well, but the sample available then was too small to command confidence. 
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Germany, Scotland, Portugal and Mexico10. Ireland has left the unentrepreneurial 
category - judging by an LR test, and China has not quite entered it, on the same 
criterion. For seven origins (France, Ireland, Netherlands, Russia, China, Sweden 
and Spain) the hypothesis of no distinctive cultural effect cannot be rejected. In 
short some countries, both entrepreneurial and unentrepeneurial, show cultural 
persistence over the twentieth century, others experienced cultural change. 
Figure 2 plots these logit culture coefficients, to show that controlled 
entrepreneurial cultural convergence is more apparent than with the unadjusted 
measure. The standard error of the 1910 effect is 0.06 so the coefficient is 
significantly less than one, and there is some cultural persistence over the century. 
Even when the Greek origin outlier in 1910 is removed, the explained variation of 
the convergence equation is still 78 percent and the coefficient 0.81. Negative 
cultural coefficients in 1910 are associated with a rise over the twentieth century 
and positive coefficients are linked with a fall. 
Persistence was sufficiently strong that origins revealing a ‘decline in 
entrepreneurial spirit’ were nonetheless often among the most entrepreneurial at 
both dates – Greece, Turkey and Italy are cases in point (Table 6). Conversely 
some of those with a ‘rise in entrepreneurial spirit’ are among the least 
entrepreneurial at both dates – England for instance.  
To summarise, migrants from Greece, Turkey and Italy, along with Jews (if the 
identification for 1910 is accepted) exhibit strong and deeply embedded 
entrepreneurial traits. But in some obvious cases also – Ireland for instance – the 
culture has changed. From the pattern of country entrepreneurship it is impossible 
to discern any sign of a Protestant-Catholic divide that might be suggested by an 
interpretation of Weber’s (1905) thesis. Nor does North-Western Europe, where 
modern economic growth originated, reveal any strong entrepreneurial cultures. 
It is not possible to estimate the impact on entrepreneurial behaviour in the 
present sample at the same time as, on the one hand, origin country institutions or 
GDP/level of development, and on the other hand, culture because in the cross-
section the measures are perfectly collinear11. But if the measures of 
                                                 
10
 Compare ‘One can only speculate about the reasons why so relatively few Mexican-Americans 
have moved into business occupations.’ Grebler et al (1970 p216) 
11
 Where Y is the probability of entrepreneurship, Xi are country or origin dummies and Z is the level of 
development of the origin countries: 
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entrepreneurial culture were erroneously reflecting these other influences they 
should be correlated which with one exception, they are not.  
In fact push factors, insofar as they are measured by the institutional variables, 
rule of law for the 2000 sample and joint stock companies per head for 1910, were 
nowhere near statistically significant. Nor was origin country GDP per capita a 
significantly predictor of entrepreneurial culture coefficients for 2000. But at the 5 
percent level GDP is significant for the 1910 coefficients (Table 7)12. The 1910 
experience most probably reflects the pattern of ‘new’ immigration from poorer 
countries and perhaps market discrimination, because the log of migrant numbers 
60 years earlier was an even more significant negative predictor, with a t ratio of 
about 3. That is, ‘pioneer’ migrants from poorer countries were more likely to be 
entrepreneurial in 1910 once their other characteristics such as age, experience 
and linguistic skills are controlled. But this relation does not persist in the year 
2000 in the present sample when the migrants are no longer ‘pioneers’.  
New immigrant groups; those from Greece, Turkey and Japan especially, but also 
elsewhere in Southern and Eastern Europe – may therefore have upward biased 
entrepreneurial coefficients in 1910 but not in 2000. A quantitative test of 
persistence may need to correct downwards some coefficients (those of the new 
immigrant groups) in 1910 before comparing them with 2000 coefficients. On the 
other hand the old immigrant countries coefficients should be more satisfactory 
for the cross-twentieth century comparison. 
Most cultures that appeared highly entrepreneurial in the first year remain so in 
the second year – Greeks, Jews, Italians and those from Turkey - when migrant 
stock effects must have worn off. Most of their entrepreneurial propensities in 
1910 cannot be attributed to the circumstances of the groups, because these 
groups remained highly entrepreneurial long after any effect of being new to the 
United States must have disappeared. Conversely much of Northwestern Europe 
stays relatively unentrepreneurial in the second year, as it was in the first. 
                                                                                                                                     
Y=a0+a1X1+a2X2 +a3X3 +a4 X4 + bZ +e ….(1) 
Z is defined as  
Z=c1X1 +c2X2 +c3X3 +c4X4      ….(2) 
where ci are the relative level of development of each country. Therefore Z is a linear combination of the 
country dummies explaining Y and will be perfectly collinear with them.  
12
 China is excluded from the 1910 sample in the estimates of Table 7 because of the filter of 
legislation on Chinese migration. 
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Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that, despite possible pioneer migrant group 
effects in the first sample year, these qualitative results are unaffected. 
Gender and Entrepreneurial Culture 
One of the biggest cultural changes over the twentieth century was in the position 
of women and especially, female participation in the formal workforce. Somewhat 
less than 20 percent of the 1910 workforce sample was female whereas by 2000 
the proportion had more than doubled. In the first year only two female ‘culture’ 
coefficients were significantly different from zero (at the 5 percent level); Irish 
women were significantly more entrepreneurial than Irish men, while the opposite 
was the case for the Scots. In the later year nine coefficients were significant.  
Females from more entrepreneurial cultures were less entrepreneurial than males 
but those from less than averagely entrepreneurial source countries were more so 
(Table 8 and Figure 3). Greek-originating females in 2000 were significantly more 
entrepreneurial than the sample average but significantly less entrepreneurial than 
their male counterparts. By contrast German-originating females were more 
entrepreneurial than males but also less entrepreneurial than the sample average. 
On the one hand females confirmed the importance of inherited entrepreneurial 
culture in the later twentieth century when the opportunity arose, but on the other, 
their behaviour differed from their male counterparts. 
Conclusion 
The analysis has employed two alternative measures of entrepreneurial culture, 
uncontrolled and controlled entrepreneurship chances. The simple uncontrolled or 
ratio measure has the merit of simplicity but does not take into account the role of 
institutions and accident in creating the possibilities for entrepreneurship. 
Migrants from some origin countries were more likely than others to be literate or 
English-speaking at the beginning of the twentieth century. Such individuals 
might be relatively highly entrepreneurial because of these attributes acquired by 
historical accident, whereas purely for cultural reasons they may be less 
entrepreneurial than those who were illiterate. The rise of Italian and Greek ratios 
over the twentieth century could be explained in the converse of these terms. 
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The second, controlled, measure is the chance of becoming an employer, holding 
constant a range of other influences on the outcome. This variable assumes that 
for instance wealth and literacy are independent of culture as far as occupational 
choice is concerned. Greater persistence of this measure over the twentieth 
century indicates that it captures a more useful trait than the ratio indicator of 
entrepreneurial culture 
Entrepreneurial cultures made a difference; migrants from some origins were 
significantly more entrepreneurial than others and most of these differences 
cannot be attributed to anything other than culture. Some entrepreneurial cultures 
also clearly persisted over the twentieth century, although for many origins they 
also changed substantially.  
The strongest entrepreneurial cultures were exhibited by those originating from 
the Middle East, Greece and Turkey, though some additional historical material is 
necessary to establish who these people were. Consistent with a version of the 
'cultural critique', the English were persistently prone to less entrepreneurship than 
most other US immigrant groups, once controls for other entrepreneurship 
influences are included. With the sample available it is impossible to distinguish 
definitively whether English twentieth century culture was a result of a shift in the 
later nineteenth century (as Wiener (1981) contended) or was comparable with 
that of the nineteenth century and earlier. However persistence over the turbulent 
twentieth century might be taken plausibly to imply durability over the less 
traumatic long nineteenth century as well. Which alternative is appropriate has a 
bearing on how much entrepreneurial cultures matter for economic development. 
If the ‘First Industrial Nation’ rose to economic prominence with a rather 
unentrepreneurial culture, entrepreneurial cultures may be dispensable. 
That the Dutch, whose seventeenth century economic pre-eminence was no less 
remarkable than the later British performance, were consistently only about 
averagely entrepreneurial, is also compatible with the dispensability of 
entrepreneurial cultures. No less superfluous is the doctrine that the (predominant 
in the Netherlands) Protestant religion encouraged entrepreneurship. Conversely, 
the idea that ‘Catholic culture’ was inimical to economic development is not born 
out in the twentieth century by the sustained entrepreneurship of Cubans and 
Italians in the United States.  
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As female participation on the market labour force increased over the twentieth 
century, female entrepreneurship propensities were eventually moulded by these 
cultures. But female propensities also differed systematically from male traits 
acquired from the same countries of origin. 
21 
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Fig1 Entrepreneurial Cultural Convergence 1910-2000 
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Fig2 ‘Controlled’ Entrepreneurial Cultural Convergence 1910-2000 
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Fig3 Entrepreneurial Propensities by Origin Country 2000 
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Table 1: Ranked Entrepreneur Ratios 
Country of Origin 1910 Country of Origin 2000 
China 11.57% Greece 12.02%
Germany 9.24% Israel 10.72% 
Spain 8.18% Syria and Lebanon 9.45%
Greece 7.89% Italy 7.82%
Netherlands 6.75% Austria 7.11%
Russian Empire and Poland 6.14% Turkey 6.27%
Cuba 6.02% Cuba 5.75%
England 5.80% Netherlands 5.34%
Scotland 5.65% Sweden 5.14%
France 5.62% Ireland 5.11%
Turkey 5.62% France 4.84%
Total 5.54% China 4.77%
Sweden 4.97% Spain 4.37%
Ireland 3.97% Russia 4.33%
Italy 3.60% England 4.04%
Japan 2.99% Germany 3.73%
Austria 2.76% Portugal 3.56%
Portugal 2.09% Japan 3.49%
Mexico 1.73% Scotland 3.32%
Syria and Lebanon NA Total 3.31%
Israel NA Mexico 1.61%
Source: Calculated from IPUMSusa. 
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Table 2: A Level Playing Field? Entrepreneurship Ratio Regressions 
Dep. Var. 
ln(GDP per 
cap), origin 
Rule of 
Law 
JS Cos 
ln(Migrants 
60 years 
earlier) 
R2  
1910 
0.011 
(0.011). 
   0.06 
N =17 
Ex China 
2000 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
   0.003 
N=20 
Inc China 
and Russia 
1910   
0.70 
(1.90) 
 0.015 N=11 
2000  
-0.004 
(0.007) 
  0.02 N=19 
1910    
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.03 N=16 
2000    
-0.005 
(0.004) 
0.09 N=20 
Sources: GDP Maddison (2006). To obtain the GDP per capita for England and Scotland in 1910, Maddison data in 1913 
for aggregate GDP level for the UK is used, together with the Frank Geary and Tom Stark (2002) result to calculate the 
proportion of GDP produced by England and Scotland. The two figures are combined to get the aggregate GDP levels for 
these two countries. Finally, the Maddison population data are used to derive the GDP per capita. For Cuba in 1910, the 
earliest available data is 1929. Because Mexico is similar to Cuba in growth and fluctuations, we derive the data for Cuba 
by analogy with Mexico. GDP per capita for Mexico in 1913 and 1929 does not change much. Hence, we assume GDP per 
capita for Cuba in 1913 is the same as 1929, i.e. 1639. For the group of Russian Empire and Poland in 1910, we take 
average of the two countries to get the GDP per capita for this group. 
JS Cos. Mainly Webb, A.D. (1911) New Dictionary of Statistics, Routledge; China, W. K.K. Chan, Merchant, Mandarins, 
and Modern Enterprises in Late Ch'ing China, p.181; Greece, 1900 ten SA companies in operation (A.Angelopoulos, 
Soceiete Anonymes Companies in Greece, Athens, 1928, in Greek).1920 two hundred SA companies in 
operation.(G.Haritakis, Economic Yearbook of Greece for 1929, Athens, 1930.in Greek). Thanks to Kai Chan and Ioanna 
Minoglou for these country sources. 
Rule of Law: Kaufman et al. (2008). Migrants: IPUMSusa. Note : Standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 3: Entrepreneurial Cultural Change 1910-2000 (Ratio) 

1910 
Entrepreneurship 
Ratio
Change in Entrepreneurship Ratio 1910-2000
Germany 0.0924 0.524613
Spain 0.0818 0.53423
Scotland 0.0565 0.587611
England 0.058 0.696552
Netherland 0.0675 0.791111
France 0.0562 0.86121
‘Decline of the Entrepreneurial Spirit’
Mexico 0.0173 0.930636
Cuba 0.0602 0.95515
Sweden 0.0497 1.034205
Turkey 0.0562 1.115658
Japan 0.0299 1.167224
‘Persistence of Entrepreneurial Culture’
Wales 0.0343 1.279883
Ireland 0.0397 1.287154
Greece 0.0789 1.523447
Portugal 0.0209 1.703349
Italy 0.036 2.172222
Austria 0.0276 2.576087
‘Rise of the Entrepreneurial Spirit’
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Table 4: Entrepreneurial Culture Controls 1910 and 2000: Logit Equations  
Control Variable 1910 2000
Gender (male = 1) 0.0114*** 0.0131***
Marital Status (married = 1) 0.0145*** 0.00629***
6~10 years in US 0.00779** 0.00523***
11~15 years in US 0.0157*** 0.00828***
16~20 years in US 0.0127*** 0.00914***
21+ years in US 0.0148*** 0.00575***
Naturalization 0.0160*** 0.00325***
Education (Literacy) 0.0106*** NA
Education (Grade 1~12) NA 0.000319
Education (1 to 3 years of college) NA 0.00371***
Education (4+ years of college) NA 0.00746***
English Speaking 0.0143*** 0.00489***
Construction 0.0774*** 0.0457*** 
Manufacturing, durables   0.0107* -0.00640* 
Manufacturing, nondurables 0.0354*** -0.00206 
Transportation, Communication, and Other Utilities  0.0075 0.0102 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.0199*** 0.0286*** 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, Business and Repair Services 0.102*** 0.0280*** 
Personal, Entertainment and Recreation Services 0.106*** 0.0050 
Age 0.00227*** 0.00196***
Age Squared-0.0000196***-0.0000156***
Own Property 0.0160*** 0.0108***
Pseudo-R2 0.2542 0.1229 
Log Likelihood -9189.9232 -66997.433 
Number of Observations 52890 499072 
NB: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
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Table 5: Ranked Entrepreneurship Logit Coefficients Origin Country Effects 
Country of Origin 1910 Country of Origin 2000 
Greece 0.1168800 Israel 0.025877
Spain 0.0525987 Greece 0.020418
Turkey 0.0524368 Syria and Lebanon 0.017944
China 0.0362195 Turkey 0.011009
Russian Empire and Poland 0.0244376 Austria 0.005937
Cuba 0.0202049 Italy 0.005885
Japan 0.0171956 Sweden 0.005043
Italy 0.0124276 Cuba 0.002495
Mexico 0.0046409 France 0.002106
Austria 0.0016950 Russia 0.000323
Germany 0.0007538 Spain 0.000304
France -0.0012503 Netherlands 0.000021
Scotland -0.0025978 Ireland -0.00035
Netherlands -0.0028670 China -0.00094
England -0.0042521 Japan -0.00256
Sweden -0.0066595 Germany -0.00326
Portugal -0.0068122 England -0.00341
Ireland -0.0102570 Portugal -0.00625
Syria and Lebanon NA Scotland -0.00776
Israel NA Mexico -0.01565
Note: Coefficients from logit equations in Table 4. 
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Table 6: Entrepreneurial Cultural Change 1910-200 (Coefficients) 
Country
Origin 
Country Effect 
1910
Change in Entrepreneurial Culture 
Coefficients 
1910-2000
Greece 0.11688 -0.09646
Spain 0.052599 -0.0523
Turkey 0.052437 -0.04143
Mexico 0.004641 -0.02029
Japan 0.017196 -0.01975
Cuba 0.020205 -0.01771
Italy 0.012428 -0.00654
Scotland -0.0026 -0.00516
Germany 0.000754 -0.00401
Portugal -0.00681 0.000566
England -0.00425 0.000846
Jew (Russian Empire and Poland 1910; Israel 2000) 0.024438 0.001439
Netherlands -0.00287 0.002888
France -0.00125 0.003356
Austria 0.001695 0.004242
Ireland -0.01026 0.009904
Sweden -0.00666 0.011702
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Table 7: A Level Playing Field? Entrepreneurial Culture Coefficients 
Dep. Var. 
ln(GDP per 
cap), origin 
Rule of 
Law 
JS Cos. 
ln(Migrants 60 
years earlier) 
R2  
1910 
-0.03 
(0.015) 
   0.26 
N=17 
Ex China 
2000 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
   0.005 N=20 
1910   
-0.04 
(0.03) 
 0.17 
N=11 
Ex China 
2000  
-0.0009 
(0.002) 
  0.008 N=20 
1910    
-0.016 
(0.005) 
0.39 
N=17 
Ex China 
2000    
0.0026 
(0.003) 
0.03 
N=19 
Ex Israel 
Male 
1910 
-0.04 
(0.02) 
   0.26 
N=17 
Ex China 
Male 
2000 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
   0.004 N=20 
Sources: see Table 2. 
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Table 8: Entrepreneurial Culture Gender Effects 1910 and 2000: Logit Equations 
1910 2000 
Country of Origin 
Female Male Female Male 
Mexico 0.00253 0.00397 -0.00603*** -0.0236*** 
Cuba – 0.0306 0.00185 0.00299* 
England -0.000336 -0.00519* -0.00346** -0.00337** 
France 0.00248 -0.00289 0.00248 0.0023 
Germany 0.00219 0.000414 -0.00217* -0.00402*** 
Ireland -0.00461** -0.0111*** -0.00296 0.00133 
Netherlands -0.00133 -0.0034 0.000549 -0.000477 
Italy 0.00241 0.0144*** 0.00227 0.00772*** 
Greece – 0.135*** 0.0123*** 0.0256*** 
Turkey 0.00644 0.0632*** -0.00178 0.0184*** 
Russia 0.00176 0.0299*** -0.00099 0.00125 
China – 0.0475*** 0.00199 -0.00311** 
Japan 0.00184 0.0207 -0.00175 -0.00281 
Syria and Lebanon NA NA 0.00655* 0.0240*** 
Israel NA NA 0.0132*** 0.0341*** 
Sweden -0.0023 -0.00755*** 0.00231 0.00801 
Austria -0.00317 0.00298 0.0106* 0.00363 
Scotland -0.00598*** -0.00105 -0.00705*** -0.00849*** 
Portugal 0.00786 -0.00992 -0.00539*** -0.00763*** 
Spain – 0.0677* 0.000981 -0.000389 
Pseudo-R2 0.1914 0.2502 0.0783 0.1359 
Log Likelihood -745.71161 -8394.4815 -22479.969 -44244.964 
Number of Observations 9056 43782 217050 282022 
NB: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Controls not reported. 
 
